Saturday, March 16, 2024

Trump Misunderstands and Endangers NATO

Donald Trump continues to offer regular bits of tastelessness showcasing his unfitness for the American presidency.  On February 10 at a campaign rally in South Carolina the presumptive Republican nominee told his audience that when he was president the leader of an unnamed NATO country asked him: ‘Well, sir, if we don't pay and were attacked by Russia, will you protect us?’ I said: ‘You didn’t pay? You’re delinquent?’ He said: ‘Yes, let’s say that happened.’ ‘No I would not protect you.”  “In fact,” said the ex-president, “I would encourage them [the Russians] to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay! You gotta pay your bills.”

Not only has Trump never favored NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, formed in 1949 by the US, Canada, and thirteen European nations to provide collective security against the Soviet Union.  He has also never demonstrated he understands what it is.  Despite being corrected numerous times, he has deliberately misunderstood the organization as a protection racket in which European countries pay in to receive US military protection from Russia.  So, in one sense, his comment was no surprise, just a repeat of his well-known ignorance.

By way of background, NATO is a military alliance founded in 1949.  In “Article 5” of their founding document, NATO countries agreed upon a goal that each would spend 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on their own military expenditures.  So, the 2% is not a payment to NATO or to the United States; rather it is a self-determined goal of a level of military spending.  Fewer than half of NATO countries have ever met that goal.

Trump’s comments imply that he believes that NATO countries have committed to pay a certain amount to the alliance and that many are delinquent in their payments, which reveals a singular misunderstanding of the actual treaty.

Much more concerning than Trump’s misunderstanding, however, is the second half of his statement, that not only would Trump as president not protect “delinquent” countries, but he would also go further to encourage Russia to attack them, to “do whatever the hell they want.”  Here is a US presidential candidate sending a clear statement that as president he would not stand in the way of a Russian attack on a US European ally.  It is a statement breathtaking in its ignorance.

Trump’s defenders often suggest that such statements are just Trump talking, “Trump-being-Trump.”  This is to ignore the crucial fact that in politics words matter.  Certainly European officials heard much more than Trump-being-Trump.  According to The Council of Foreign Relations

Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, called Trump’s statement “reckless” and said it would “serve only Putin’s interest.”

Trump has made it very clear that if he becomes president, the US commitment to protect Europe from Russia will be a dead letter.  It is a statement that he could not walk back even if he understood why he should.

Tuesday, February 27, 2024

Trump Refusal to Lose Endagers Democracy

Donald Trump’s Republican candidacy for president of the United States provides a perfect cover for legitimizing the former president and forcing the mainstream media to cover him as a normal political candidate.  But Trump is not a normal political candidate.  He has refused to acknowledge his defeat in the 2020 election.  He incited the January 6, 2021 insurrection.  He was recently convicted and fined over $400 million for corruptly inflating the value of his properties in New York in order to defraud his creditors.

Trump’s refusal to acknowledge his 2020 defeat is more than a symptom of his narcissistic megalomania; it also demonstrates his complete unwillingness, indeed, inability, to understand democracy.  Democracy is conditioned upon the practice that the loser accepts their defeat.  If the candidate believes there has been error or fraud, they can challenge the results, ultimately in the courts.  But once those remedies have been exhausted – and Trump has thoroughly exhausted the legal remedies with over fifty losses in the courts following his 2020 electoral loss – our democratic system requires that the loser accept defeat.  For democracy to function, defeated candidates must acknowledge their loss.

But Donald Trump is psychologically incapable of accepting defeat.  While his victory in this November’s presidential election would be a disaster of unimaginable proportions for the United States (and the world), his loss will also bring about chaos of another kind.  For Trump will not be able to accept it … literally.  He will be incapable of believing that he lost a legitimate election and will be convinced (actually convinced, I believe, although the point is debatable) that the election was stolen from him.

There’s no way to be sure, of course, how he will respond to this loss, but I believe that a refusal to concede victory accompanied by a call to his supporters for a violent response (as in the January 6 insurrection) is more than likely.  I can well imagine him calling upon his supporters in the military to respond.

As I have written in my last post, I do not believe that he will win this election.  But we as a country must also be prepared for his response to his loss. 

It will not be pretty.

Wednesday, February 14, 2024

Our Primary Political Task

For anyone concerned about the future of the American democracy, the primary political task for the next 265 days until November 5, 2024, is to prevent Donald Trump from regaining the presidency.  Like many political observers, I don’t trust electoral polls this far out, but it is disconcerting to note that all of the polls show Trump winning handily over Biden.  Trump’s chances in the swing states are even better. 

 It is incumbent upon us who are committed to democracy to continue to shine a light on the fact that a second Trump presidency would likely mean the end of democracy as we know it in the United States.

That is an apocalyptic statement from one not one normally given to apocalyptic statements.  But, in my defense, Trump has told us how he will act as president (in the unlikely event we re-elect him, more on that below).  He has acknowledged that he will:

·    weaponize the Justice Department to go after Joe Biden and other political enemies;

·    internally deport millions of undocumented immigrants to newly built detention centers in Texas;

·    act as a dictator “for day one” of his presidency to build a wall separating the United States from Mexico and renew oil drilling.

It’s easy to be misled by Trump’s sloppy proclamations, loose statements or refusals to deny his intent.  Witness the following exchange, as reported by the Guardian, with Sean Hannity, a Trump supporter, who leans over backward to give Trump a chance to exonerate himself.

“Under no circumstances, you are promising America tonight, you would never abuse power as retribution against anybody?” Hannity asked Trump in the interview taped in Davenport, Iowa on Tuesday.

“Except for day one,” Trump responded. Trump said on the “day one” he referred to, he would use his presidential powers to close the southern border with Mexico and expand oil drilling.

Trump then repeated his assertion. “I love this guy,” he said of the Fox News host. “He says, ‘You’re not going to be a dictator, are you?’ I said: ‘No, no, no, other than day one. We’re closing the border and we’re drilling, drilling, drilling. After that, I’m not a dictator.’”

As the Associated Press (AP) reports:

Trump has a long history of making inflammatory proclamations that spark outrage from detractors and generate a stream of headlines, without ever coming to fruition. Often they are made in a tongue-in-cheek manner that allows Trump’s allies to claim he was joking and cite the backlash as another example of a candidate skilled at baiting an out-of-touch press that takes him far too literally.

The problem with AP’s analysis is that this allows Trump to say exactly what he is planning to do while desensitizing his supporters and the press to the truly shocking nature of his schemes.

Trump’s enablers -- for instance, the creators of Project 2025: The Presidential Transition Project at the Heritage Foundation -- are not joking.  They are identifying hundreds, if not thousands, of conservative bureaucrats to be ready on Day One to effectively put Trump’s dreams into concrete action.

When Trump first assumed office in 2016, he seemed often starstruck, as if he had not quite expected to win and was shocked that the country’s A-listers were willing to work for him from the oval office.  These experienced politicians, military officers, and bureaucrats, in fact, protected the country from Trump’s worst excesses. 

Trump will not make the same mistake twice; this time he – and the Heritage Foundation – will be sure that those under him will do exactly what he tells them.

I do think it is unlikely that Trump will be re-elected.  Less than 40% of voters are loyal-for-whatever Trumpists.  If he is convicted on any of the 91 felony counts against him, a significant percentage of even these Trumpists will not vote for him.*For re-election he will depend upon the few traditional Republicans left in the party and the independents who supported him before, at least some of whom have been paying attention and are unlikely to vote for him again.

Nevertheless, the two-party, hyperpartisan electoral system that dominates American politics assures a close election regardless of the candidates.  It is incumbent upon us who are clear-eyed about Trump to keep educating the public about the danger he presents to an ever more fragile democracy, and we must not allow the media to normalize Trump’s behavior or treat him as a legitimate candidate.  Trump is not a legitimate candidate; he is a populist demagogue who must not be allowed again to the pinnacle of power.

__________ 

** Many of those who vote for Trump believe the indictments to be politically motivated.  If he is actually convicted in public jury trials that make clear the evidence against him, some of that support will fall away.

Saturday, April 22, 2023

The Magic of Multiparty Democracy

Sixth in a Series on Multiparty Democracy

As I argued at the beginning of this series, the hyperpartisanship that has derailed American democracy is a direct result of the ideologically-sorted two-party system that has characterized national politics in the United States for the last generation.  As Lee Drutman has written, this hyperpartisanship is a doom-loop that will either maintain the political dysfunction or, more likely, devolve into increasing violence and/or autocracy.

The only solution to this political dysfunction is a multiparty democracy.  Drutman (p. 206) details some of the benefits of the multiparty system as follows:

  • More parties mean more diversity of representation. 
  • Voters in multiparty democracy are more likely to find a party they affirmatively like, rather than simply support as the lesser of two evils.  
  • Voters are more likely to feel represented and engaged politically.  
  • Minority voters need not cluster together into majority-minority districts to elect their candidates of choice.  
  • And when countries use proportional representation to generate multiparty democracy, voters don't have to live in "swing" districts for their votes to matter.  Under a proportional system, almost all votes matter equally, regardless of where they are cast; elections do not come down to a limited number of "swing" districts. 

But the real advantage to multiparty democracy occurs when the politicians come together to legislate.  In a true multiparty democracy, no party has a majority; no party can pass laws by itself.  Rather, legislators must form coalitions to pass laws according to their own platforms and the views of their supporters.  These coalitions tend to be shifting, coalescing around specific issues.  The opposition in this week’s voting on tax policy may be the partners in next week’s voting on immigration.  As issues shift, the coalitions shift, and politicians recognize that maintaining negotiating relationships with one another is crucial to their own best interests.  Multiparty democracy regularizes compromise and coalition building. Since parties need to work together to govern, more viewpoints are likely to be heard.

As I described in an earlier post, the vast majority of world democracies have multiple parties — the average is five or six.  Drutman summarizes the political science research, which is deafening in its support of multiparty democracy.

Multiparty legislatures in proportional democracies have a strong record of producing broadly acceptable moderate policy outcomes.  As a general rule, when a wider range of parties gets representation in the legislature, it's hard to form a majority governing coalition that doesn't include the political center.  And once coalitions form, they have a strong incentive to produce policy outcomes that that are broadly acceptable, because staying in the middle divides the potential opposition.

  • Multiparty legislatures can also be more responsive to issue-specific majorities, because different coalitions are more likely to form across different issues.  
  • Because multiparty systems are better at incorporating multiple dimensions into politics, coalition building can be more fluid.  Enemies can sometimes be allies.  
  • And this cooperation communicates a more multifaceted politics back to citizens: there are no permanent majorities and no permanent minorities.  
  • Coalition multiparty government demands complex negotiation that tends to reflect and build broad public support far better than majoritarian democracy.  
  • It also means citizens in the minority on one issue don't have to be in the minority on all issues.

True majority coalitions on complex issues are hard to build.  They take time. 

 Again the research is clear:

More inclusive policymaking brings in more diverse views, which almost always generates a more sustainable final output.  In multiparty democracy policymaking is more incremental, and thus more stable.  …

Because multiparty democracy demands broadly inclusive policymaking and makes it hard for minorities or even narrow majorities to sharply change policy, voters in multiparty democracies are much more likely to view governments as legitimate regardless of how well their party did in the last election.

If parties don't campaign in all-or-nothing terms, voters won't see elections in those terms either.  As a result, voters in multiparty democracies are happier with their governments, regardless of whether or not their party won the last election.  This satisfaction has important consequences.  It lends more legitimacy and support to government, which gives political leaders more space to solve big problems.  Voters are more likely to feel like they are being heard, largely because they are better represented. (Drutman p. 215-16)

As a progressive, part of me fears the centrist moderation that multiparty democracy breeds.  But then I remember two things:

  1. The current toxic hyperpartisanship is the worst of all worlds, hurtling us toward political violence and autocracy.
  2. Strong majorities of Americans actually support progressive policies:
  • Sensible gun control
  • Reasonable immigration reform
  • Higher taxes on the wealthy to provide adequate services for all
  • Government support for the truly needy
  • Moderate abortion policies (roughly along the lines of Roe v Wade)

 A multiparty democracy in which the democratic will of the people prevailed would be a far more progressive politics than we can now even dream.  As a progressive, I don’t need to fear democracy.

The American political system in in crisis.  During more than half the legislative session since 1993, we have had divided government in which neither party controlled all three branches (presidency, Senate and House).  During those periods, the government is essentially paralyzed and many of the most important problems facing us cannot be addressed.  When one party does take control, policy swings wildly only to be contradicted when the other party gets control.  The dysfunction has drained what little public trust has remained for government, putting us at even higher risk for increasing political violence and/or autocratic takeover.

The solution — multiparty democracy — is clear.  Let’s begin to build it.

Next: The Fair Representation Act: A Legislative Path to Multiparty Democracy

Tuesday, March 28, 2023

Ranked Choice Voting

Fifth in a series on moving toward a multiparty democracy

For the past few months, I’ve been taking deep dives into the importance of fixing American democracy (here and here), and thoughts about how we might do that (here and here). Today, I’m beginning to focus on what is actually happening.

The movement toward multiparty democracy in the United States now comprises two pieces: a very active, grassroots Ranked-Choice-Voting movement that has had early success in changing voting structures across the United States; and the Fair Representation Act currently stalled in Congress, awaiting Supreme Court decisions that may necessitate changes in how the Act is written.

Ranked Choice Voting Is a First Step

Ranked choice voting (RCV) is a relatively minor change to the electoral process that will have a major positive impact on American politics.  It is a straightforward change that makes sense to most people.  It can be used in elections for President, for the US Senate and the US House of Representatives as well as elections at every level from state legislature to school boards to city councils.  RCV can be used in single member districts or multimember districts.  It is an electoral change that states can make without any action from Congress, even for federal elections.  

As you can see from this page on the RankTheVote website, ranked-choice voting is already being used across the country.  Twenty-eight states include at least one jurisdiction that uses RCV.  Fifty-four jurisdictions across the country have used or enacted RCV.  

Below, from Lee Drutman’s Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop is an example of how it might work in a particular election with a sample ballot with five candidates.  The voter fills in the ellipses for their five choices. 

 The tallying of the votes might proceed as follows:
Let’s say after the first count the tally is:
Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—30%
Jalil Smiley-McGraw (Democrat)—26%
Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—24%
Susan McLaughlin-Malaki (Green)—12%
John Green-Bertrand (Libertarian—8%
The Libertarian, Green-Bertrand, finishes last in the first count and is the first to be eliminated.  Let’s say half of his supporters ranked the Republican next and half picked the Centrist-Independent next.  After the votes transfer, the new tally is:
Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—34% (+4%)
Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—28% (+4%, into second place)
Jalil Smiley-McGraw (Democrat)—26%
Susan McLaughlin-Malaki (Green)—12%

Now the Green candidate, McLaughlin-Malaki, is eliminated. Half of her next-choice votes go to the Democrat, half to the Centrist-Independent. After the votes are transferred, the new tally is:
Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—34%
Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—34% (+6%, into a tie for first place)
Jalil Smiley-McGraw (Democrat)—32% (+6%)

Now the Democrat, Jalil-Smiley McGraw is eliminated. Most of his second-place votes go to the Centrist-Independent, and the final tally is:
Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—64% (+30%)
Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—36% (+2%)
In a simple plurality election, the Republican candidate, Edelmann-Ryssdal, would win with just 30 percent of the vote.  But true-preference ranking showed her support was shallow. The Centrist-Independent, Christine Horvath-Gonzales, preferred in the first count by only 24 per-cent of the voters, wound up the winner. That's because lots of voters liked her second-best, as the reasonable alternative voters could live with even if their favorite candidate didn't win. She had the broadest support.

Of course, in a simple plurality election, Horvath-Gonzales might never have run in the first place, for fear of being a spoiler. Or she would have tried to run as a Democrat or a Republican, moving left or right to win either party's primary.

Voters who wanted a centrist would have had to choose between the Democrat and the Republican. So would voters who wanted a Libertarian or a Green candidate but who didn't want to waste their vote. With most voters locked into Democratic or Republican camps, both candidates would have focused primarily on turning out their bases.  Ranked-choice voting allows voters to vote their sincere preference without fearing they will “spoil” the election.  Ranked-choice voting thus encourages candidates who might not otherwise run, expanding the field of debate and giving voters more choice.

Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop (p. 177-180)

The website https://rankthevote.us describes the advantages:
Ranked Choice Voting gives a strong voice to all voters in our elections, and ensures candidates with the broadest support get to govern.

No more “hold your nose” votes.  Ranked Choice Voting is a simple change that gives voters the option to rank candidates for office in the order they prefer them: 1, 2, 3.

More Expression

As a voter, Ranked Choice Voting allows you to express your full range of views on the ballot — not just one.  You can vote for your true favorite, and you can compromise with your backup rankings.

Less Divisiveness

By allowing voters to rank candidates in the order they like them, Ranked Choice voting helps consolidate, rather than divide, competing factions.  Candidates need the support of the broadest possible coalition of their constituents — not just a vocal minority.

More Positivity

Ranked Choice Voting encourages positive campaigns.  Candidates need to earn the 2nd and 3rd choice votes of their opponent’s supporters by appealing to what they have in common.  With Ranked Choice Voting, politicians are rewarded for campaigning on issues and showing compromise, not for tearing down the other side.

One little-discussed advantage to ranked choice voting is that it allows for activist, third-party candidates to negotiate with a major party candidate for their support.  For instance, an activist campaigning for workers whose incomes have stagnated over the last forty years might agree to recommend his voters rank the Democratic candidate second if the Democrat agreed to support a bill to tax the wealthy and give tax benefits to the working class.  It’s the kind of negotiation that is common in Australia where they have had RCV for over a century,

Ranked choice voting is an important first step away from the current toxic hyperpartisanship.  It is a necessary precondition to a multiparty democracy, for it allows voters to vote for a third-party candidate without concern they will waste their vote.  This is positive in that it gives third parties a fighting chance, but I fear it will not in itself have the power to get us to a multi-party democracy because our two-party hyperpartisanship will overpower it and — except in particular local conditions — will rarely allow for the election of a third party.

Federal legislative change to mandate multimember districts for election to the House of Representatives will be necessary to actually make possible a multiparty democracy in the United States.

Next post: The Magic of Multiparty Democracy.

Wednesday, February 15, 2023

Multiparty Democracy Elsewhere

Fourth in a series on moving toward a multiparty democracy

Most democracies in the world have more than two parties, the average being between three and six.  Although the details vary considerably, most use some form of proportional representation, which means that the legislature contains numbers of representatives from each party that are proportionate to the number of voters who identify with that party.  Proportional systems almost always lead to multiple parties.  Although most of those countries are parliamentary systems, presidential systems in South America and elsewhere also use multiple parties successfully.

Proportional Representation Determined by a Vote for Party

Germany is typical of the most common systems in which voters indicate both their preferred national party and vote for a local district candidate.  The vote for the party then determines the proportion of legislators allotted to that party in the Bundestag (parliament).  The votes for the local district candidates fill half (328) of the Bundestag seats.  The other 328 seats are filled by the parties at the national level proportionately.

Over the last five decades, no single party has had a majority in the German Bundestag, so stable coalitions have developed, which have been favored by voters over single-party governments.

(Most countries require a party to have a minimum percentage of the electorate — usually 4% or 5% — to qualify for representation to avoid fracturing with multiple tiny parties.)  

Single Transferable Vote (STV)

Since voters in the United States tend to distrust political parties, these European systems emphasizing parties may be less acceptable.  

The proportional system most likely to appeal to Americans is some version of the single-transferable vote system (STV) with ranked-choice voting.  Unlike American electoral districts for the House of Representatives in which only one member is elected from each district, STV requires multimember districts that send anywhere from three to six (or more) representatives to the legislature.  

Ireland has used the single-transferable vote system since its founding in 1921.  For the voter, the system is quite straightforward: the voter chooses among candidates (often 10 – 15 candidates in a five-member district) and ranks them in order of preference, placing a number 1 beside their favored candidate, then indicates second, third, etc choices, if desired.  About two-thirds of voters see their first-choice candidate elected.  

For much of the 20th century, Ireland had only two main parties, but since 1989 the STV system has resulted in multiple parties with stable coalitions.  Each of the five largest parties has participated in at least one coalition.  

Counting the votes within the STV, however, is somewhat more complicated (see information handout for Irish voters).  For each electoral district, the “threshold number” of votes is determined, which is the minimum number that would guarantee victory among the multimember field.  Votes beyond the threshold are termed “surplus votes.”  In order to make sure surplus votes are not wasted, once a candidate reaches the threshold, their votes are distributed according to a formula to the second- and third-ranked candidates.  Through multiple rounds of voting (done by computer), the second- and third- choices of losing candidates are also re-distributed.

While this system is very easy to program into a computer to make election results available automatically and immediately, its complexity might mean it would take Americans — now distrustful of all things political and many things computerized — longer to accept as legitimate.  

Presidential Democracies

Most of the world’s multiparty democracies are parliamentary, meaning that legislation only requires a majority in parliament.  The situation in presidential democracies is more complicated since the president must work with the legislatures to pass legislation, and can also wield the power of the veto.  Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Panama, and Columbia, however, have all had successful, stable presidential democracies with multiple parties, as has Indonesia in Asia.  

Fortunately, the United States has the characteristics that have allowed presidential democracies in Central and South America to work well, as researched by the Journal of Democracy:

  • The office of the executive is powerful so that the president can reward cooperating legislators with cabinet posts, pork projects, and policy concessions.
  • Congress, too, is strong and can provide oversight of the president.
  • Other institutions in the democracy are vigorous, especially a free media but also the courts, public prosecutors, and other independent oversight institutions.

Across much of Latin America, multiparty presidentialism has boosted political stability. As long as robust political competition and a strong set of autonomous institutions exist and potential excesses are kept within bounds, these multiparty democracies have not degenerated into systemic corruption.  

Moving Forward

Challenges to the development of an American multiparty system abound, but it is important to recognize that with only two parties, the American system is an outlier.  I believe, as do Lee Drutman and most political scientists, that we must find our way to a multiparty system if we are to overcome the extreme and poisonous hyperpartisanship that has characterized American politics for the last generation.

Next: Ranked Choice Voting

Saturday, January 28, 2023

When Identity Dominates Politics

Third in a series on moving toward a multiparty democracy

I had intended this post to examine how more political parties might break the doom loop of our toxic political partisanship.  But I realize I need first to look at how the question of identity has come to dominate our politics.

As Lee Drutman explains in his Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop, political conflict tends to break down into two dominant questions:

1. Who gets what?  This is a question of economics and the distribution of material resources.  It typically breaks down into a conflict between:
  • government as interventionist and egalitarian, actively rebalancing inequities by redistribution through social programs and taxation, and
  • a market-oriented perspective, where government protects property rights but mostly gets out of the way with little regulation, low taxes, and few transfers.

Because these are ultimately questions of money and material resources, compromise in the who-gets-what question is often possible.  Drutman gives the example:

If I think the top marginal tax rate should be 45% and start at $1,000,000 and you think it should be 25% and start at $500,000, we can meet in the middle.  Let’s say the top rate is 35%, starting at $750,000, and call it a fair compromise. (p. 132)

2. Who are we?  These are questions of national identity, culture, values, and social group hierarchy.  Today, the identity conflict is between cosmopolitan and traditionalist values.  These are much less amenable to compromise. Drutman writes:

Those who hold cosmopolitan values favor individual self-expression and personal liberation over duty and religious observance.  Cosmopolitans are more open to outsiders, more likely to want to leave the past in the past, and more eager for a transformative future.  They are less rooted in any particular place and more open to new experiences, and they embrace more universalist beliefs.  Under these values, diversity is a strength to be celebrated, and immigrants contribute more than they take away.  Cosmopolitans tend to congregate in big cities and are generally younger.

Those who hold traditionalist values are generally nostalgic about the past and pessimistic about the future.  Traditionalists value duty and responsibility over self-expression.  They tend to stay in one place and are less interested in new experiences.  They are rooted in their community and religion, and tend to live in rural areas.  They value preserving their existing community and values, which makes them skeptical toward outsiders with different values.  They often view immigrants as threats. (p. 133)

These are, of course, stereotypes.  And that’s just the problem.  They accurately describe hardly anyone.  But wedged into the two parties, stereotypes are what we’re left with.  Historically, these differences (think abortion) tend to be bitter with little room for compromise.

In the party realignment that occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s (see my previous posts in this series here and here, as well as this one from several years ago), national identity has come to dominate the political discussion, while questions of who gets what are less prominent.  

[Although the Democratic Party has had a stronger emphasis on economic redistribution (for instance, the infrastructure bills passed during the last two years during the Democratic control of the presidency, House and Senate), the Democrats, too, have a strong “donor class” that has prevented real economic distribution.  The result has been increasing economic inequality over the last forty years facilitated by both Democrats and Republicans.]

What has happened, however, is that the question of identity has come to dominate our politics, overwhelming the question of who gets what.  The “cosmopolitans” and the “traditionalists” see each other as utter strangers, even enemies.  Compromise is rare enough to be noteworthy.

In addition to the toxic partisanship that develops when identity becomes the primary issue, the real diversity of interest among people is lost.  Most people are not well represented by either “cosmopolitans” (Democrats) or “traditionalists” (Republicans).  Where does the traditionalist populist from the rust belt who has been decimated by the growing economic inequality of the last forty years find someone to represent him?  Where does the deeply pro-choice, middle-class entrepreneur committed to low regulation and low taxes find someone to represent her?  Where does the Catholic activist committed to the seamless garment of anti-abortion, anti-capital-punishment, and international pacifism find someone to represent them?  Where do I, David Hilfiker, who favors deep taxation of the wealthy with powerful redistribution to the poor and middle-class find someone to represent me?  The answers are the same: the two-party system gives none of us anyone to represent us.  Our votes don’t count because there is no one to vote for.

Two-party hyperpartisanship punishes us all.  Each of us is left voting for the candidates who offend us the least, rather than voting for those who actually represent what we want.

Next: Multiparty democracy elsewhere