The Magic of Multiparty Democracy

Sixth in a Series on Multiparty Democracy

As I argued at the beginning of this series, the hyperpartisanship that has derailed American democracy is a direct result of the ideologically-sorted two-party system that has characterized national politics in the United States for the last generation.  As Lee Drutman has written, this hyperpartisanship is a doom-loop that will either maintain the political dysfunction or, more likely, devolve into increasing violence and/or autocracy.

The only solution to this political dysfunction is a multiparty democracy.  Drutman (p. 206) details some of the benefits of the multiparty system as follows:

• More parties mean more diversity of representation. 
  
• Voters in multiparty democracy are more likely to find a party they affirmatively like, rather than simply support as the lesser of two evils.  
• Voters are more likely to feel represented and engaged politically.  
• Minority voters need not cluster together into majority-minority districts to elect their candidates of choice.  
• And when countries use proportional representation to generate multiparty democracy, voters don't have to live in "swing" districts for their votes to matter.  Under a proportional system, almost all votes matter equally, regardless of where they are cast; elections do not come down to a limited number of "swing" districts. 

But the real advantage to multiparty democracy occurs when the politicians come together to legislate.  In a true multiparty democracy, no party has a majority; no party can pass laws by itself.  Rather, legislators must form coalitions to pass laws according to their own platforms and the views of their supporters.  These coalitions tend to be shifting, coalescing around specific issues.  The opposition in this week’s voting on tax policy may be the partners in next week’s voting on immigration.  As issues shift, the coalitions shift, and politicians recognize that maintaining negotiating relationships with one another is crucial to their own best interests.  Multiparty democracy regularizes compromise and coalition building. Since parties need to work together to govern, more viewpoints are likely to be heard.

As I described in an earlier post, the vast majority of world democracies have multiple parties — the average is five or six.  Drutman summarizes the political science research, which is deafening in its support of multiparty democracy.

Multiparty legislatures in proportional democracies have a strong record of producing broadly acceptable moderate policy outcomes.  As a general rule, when a wider range of parties gets representation in the legislature, it's hard to form a majority governing coalition that doesn't include the political center.  And once coalitions form, they have a strong incentive to produce policy outcomes that that are broadly acceptable, because staying in the middle divides the potential opposition.

• Multiparty legislatures can also be more responsive to issue-specific majorities, because different coalitions are more likely to form across different issues.  
• Because multiparty systems are better at incorporating multiple dimensions into politics, coalition building can be more fluid.  Enemies can sometimes be allies.  
• And this cooperation communicates a more multifaceted politics back to citizens: there are no permanent majorities and no permanent minorities.  
• Coalition multiparty government demands complex negotiation that tends to reflect and build broad public support far better than majoritarian democracy.  
• It also means citizens in the minority on one issue don't have to be in the minority on all issues.

True majority coalitions on complex issues are hard to build.  They take time. 

 Again the research is clear:

More inclusive policymaking brings in more diverse views, which almost always generates a more sustainable final output.  In multiparty democracy policymaking is more incremental, and thus more stable.  …

Because multiparty democracy demands broadly inclusive policymaking and makes it hard for minorities or even narrow majorities to sharply change policy, voters in multiparty democracies are much more likely to view governments as legitimate regardless of how well their party did in the last election.

If parties don't campaign in all-or-nothing terms, voters won't see elections in those terms either.  As a result, voters in multiparty democracies are happier with their governments, regardless of whether or not their party won the last election.  This satisfaction has important consequences.  It lends more legitimacy and support to government, which gives political leaders more space to solve big problems.  Voters are more likely to feel like they are being heard, largely because they are better represented. (Drutman p. 215-16)

As a progressive, part of me fears the centrist moderation that multiparty democracy breeds.  But then I remember two things:

1. The current toxic hyperpartisanship is the worst of all worlds, hurtling us toward political violence and autocracy.
2. Strong majorities of Americans actually support progressive policies:

• Sensible gun control
• Reasonable immigration reform
• Higher taxes on the wealthy to provide adequate services for all
• Government support for the truly needy
• Moderate abortion policies (roughly along the lines of Roe v Wade)

 A multiparty democracy in which the democratic will of the people prevailed would be a far more progressive politics than we can now even dream.  As a progressive, I don’t need to fear democracy.

The American political system in in crisis.  During more than half the legislative session since 1993, we have had divided government in which neither party controlled all three branches (presidency, Senate and House).  During those periods, the government is essentially paralyzed and many of the most important problems facing us cannot be addressed.  When one party does take control, policy swings wildly only to be contradicted when the other party gets control.  The dysfunction has drained what little public trust has remained for government, putting us at even higher risk for increasing political violence and/or autocratic takeover.

The solution — multiparty democracy — is clear.  Let’s begin to build it.

Next: The Fair Representation Act: A Legislative Path to Multiparty Democracy

Ranked Choice Voting

Fifth in a series on moving toward a multiparty democracy

For the past few months, I’ve been taking deep dives into the importance of fixing American democracy (here and here), and thoughts about how we might do that (here and here). Today, I’m beginning to focus on what is actually happening.

The movement toward multiparty democracy in the United States now comprises two pieces: a very active, grassroots Ranked-Choice-Voting movement that has had early success in changing voting structures across the United States; and the Fair Representation Act currently stalled in Congress, awaiting Supreme Court decisions that may necessitate changes in how the Act is written.

Ranked Choice Voting Is a First Step

Ranked choice voting (RCV) is a relatively minor change to the electoral process that will have a major positive impact on American politics.  It is a straightforward change that makes sense to most people.  It can be used in elections for President, for the US Senate and the US House of Representatives as well as elections at every level from state legislature to school boards to city councils.  RCV can be used in single member districts or multimember districts.  It is an electoral change that states can make without any action from Congress, even for federal elections.  

As you can see from this page on the RankTheVote website, ranked-choice voting is already being used across the country.  Twenty-eight states include at least one jurisdiction that uses RCV.  Fifty-four jurisdictions across the country have used or enacted RCV.  

Below, from Lee Drutman’s Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop is an example of how it might work in a particular election with a sample ballot with five candidates.  The voter fills in the ellipses for their five choices. 

 The tallying of the votes might proceed as follows:

Let’s say after the first count the tally is:

Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—30%
Jalil Smiley-McGraw (Democrat)—26%
Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—24%
Susan McLaughlin-Malaki (Green)—12%
John Green-Bertrand (Libertarian—8%

The Libertarian, Green-Bertrand, finishes last in the first count and is the first to be eliminated.  Let’s say half of his supporters ranked the Republican next and half picked the Centrist-Independent next.  After the votes transfer, the new tally is:

Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—34% (+4%)
Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—28% (+4%, into second place)
Jalil Smiley-McGraw (Democrat)—26%
Susan McLaughlin-Malaki (Green)—12%

Now the Green candidate, McLaughlin-Malaki, is eliminated. Half of her next-choice votes go to the Democrat, half to the Centrist-Independent. After the votes are transferred, the new tally is:

Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—34%
Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—34% (+6%, into a tie for first place)
Jalil Smiley-McGraw (Democrat)—32% (+6%)

Now the Democrat, Jalil-Smiley McGraw is eliminated. Most of his second-place votes go to the Centrist-Independent, and the final tally is:

Christine Horvath-Gonzales (Centrist-Independent)—64% (+30%)
Betsy Edelmann-Ryssdal (Republican)—36% (+2%)

In a simple plurality election, the Republican candidate, Edelmann-Ryssdal, would win with just 30 percent of the vote.  But true-preference ranking showed her support was shallow. The Centrist-Independent, Christine Horvath-Gonzales, preferred in the first count by only 24 per-cent of the voters, wound up the winner. That's because lots of voters liked her second-best, as the reasonable alternative voters could live with even if their favorite candidate didn't win. She had the broadest support.

Of course, in a simple plurality election, Horvath-Gonzales might never have run in the first place, for fear of being a spoiler. Or she would have tried to run as a Democrat or a Republican, moving left or right to win either party's primary.

Voters who wanted a centrist would have had to choose between the Democrat and the Republican. So would voters who wanted a Libertarian or a Green candidate but who didn't want to waste their vote. With most voters locked into Democratic or Republican camps, both candidates would have focused primarily on turning out their bases.  Ranked-choice voting allows voters to vote their sincere preference without fearing they will “spoil” the election.  Ranked-choice voting thus encourages candidates who might not otherwise run, expanding the field of debate and giving voters more choice.

Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop (p. 177-180)

The website https://rankthevote.us describes the advantages:

Ranked Choice Voting gives a strong voice to all voters in our elections, and ensures candidates with the broadest support get to govern.

No more “hold your nose” votes.  Ranked Choice Voting is a simple change that gives voters the option to rank candidates for office in the order they prefer them: 1, 2, 3.

More Expression

As a voter, Ranked Choice Voting allows you to express your full range of views on the ballot — not just one.  You can vote for your true favorite, and you can compromise with your backup rankings.

Less Divisiveness

By allowing voters to rank candidates in the order they like them, Ranked Choice voting helps consolidate, rather than divide, competing factions.  Candidates need the support of the broadest possible coalition of their constituents — not just a vocal minority.

More Positivity

Ranked Choice Voting encourages positive campaigns.  Candidates need to earn the 2nd and 3rd choice votes of their opponent’s supporters by appealing to what they have in common.  With Ranked Choice Voting, politicians are rewarded for campaigning on issues and showing compromise, not for tearing down the other side.

One little-discussed advantage to ranked choice voting is that it allows for activist, third-party candidates to negotiate with a major party candidate for their support.  For instance, an activist campaigning for workers whose incomes have stagnated over the last forty years might agree to recommend his voters rank the Democratic candidate second if the Democrat agreed to support a bill to tax the wealthy and give tax benefits to the working class.  It’s the kind of negotiation that is common in Australia where they have had RCV for over a century,

Ranked choice voting is an important first step away from the current toxic hyperpartisanship.  It is a necessary precondition to a multiparty democracy, for it allows voters to vote for a third-party candidate without concern they will waste their vote.  This is positive in that it gives third parties a fighting chance, but I fear it will not in itself have the power to get us to a multi-party democracy because our two-party hyperpartisanship will overpower it and — except in particular local conditions — will rarely allow for the election of a third party.

Federal legislative change to mandate multimember districts for election to the House of Representatives will be necessary to actually make possible a multiparty democracy in the United States.

Next post: The Magic of Multiparty Democracy.

Multiparty Democracy Elsewhere

Fourth in a series on moving toward a multiparty democracy

Most democracies in the world have more than two parties, the average being between three and six.  Although the details vary considerably, most use some form of proportional representation, which means that the legislature contains numbers of representatives from each party that are proportionate to the number of voters who identify with that party.  Proportional systems almost always lead to multiple parties.  Although most of those countries are parliamentary systems, presidential systems in South America and elsewhere also use multiple parties successfully.

Proportional Representation Determined by a Vote for Party

Germany is typical of the most common systems in which voters indicate both their preferred national party and vote for a local district candidate.  The vote for the party then determines the proportion of legislators allotted to that party in the Bundestag (parliament).  The votes for the local district candidates fill half (328) of the Bundestag seats.  The other 328 seats are filled by the parties at the national level proportionately.

Over the last five decades, no single party has had a majority in the German Bundestag, so stable coalitions have developed, which have been favored by voters over single-party governments.

(Most countries require a party to have a minimum percentage of the electorate — usually 4% or 5% — to qualify for representation to avoid fracturing with multiple tiny parties.)  

Single Transferable Vote (STV)

Since voters in the United States tend to distrust political parties, these European systems emphasizing parties may be less acceptable.  

The proportional system most likely to appeal to Americans is some version of the single-transferable vote system (STV) with ranked-choice voting.  Unlike American electoral districts for the House of Representatives in which only one member is elected from each district, STV requires multimember districts that send anywhere from three to six (or more) representatives to the legislature.  

Ireland has used the single-transferable vote system since its founding in 1921.  For the voter, the system is quite straightforward: the voter chooses among candidates (often 10 – 15 candidates in a five-member district) and ranks them in order of preference, placing a number 1 beside their favored candidate, then indicates second, third, etc choices, if desired.  About two-thirds of voters see their first-choice candidate elected.  

For much of the 20th century, Ireland had only two main parties, but since 1989 the STV system has resulted in multiple parties with stable coalitions.  Each of the five largest parties has participated in at least one coalition.  

Counting the votes within the STV, however, is somewhat more complicated (see information handout for Irish voters).  For each electoral district, the “threshold number” of votes is determined, which is the minimum number that would guarantee victory among the multimember field.  Votes beyond the threshold are termed “surplus votes.”  In order to make sure surplus votes are not wasted, once a candidate reaches the threshold, their votes are distributed according to a formula to the second- and third-ranked candidates.  Through multiple rounds of voting (done by computer), the second- and third- choices of losing candidates are also re-distributed.

While this system is very easy to program into a computer to make election results available automatically and immediately, its complexity might mean it would take Americans — now distrustful of all things political and many things computerized — longer to accept as legitimate.  

Presidential Democracies

Most of the world’s multiparty democracies are parliamentary, meaning that legislation only requires a majority in parliament.  The situation in presidential democracies is more complicated since the president must work with the legislatures to pass legislation, and can also wield the power of the veto.  Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Panama, and Columbia, however, have all had successful, stable presidential democracies with multiple parties, as has Indonesia in Asia.  

Fortunately, the United States has the characteristics that have allowed presidential democracies in Central and South America to work well, as researched by the Journal of Democracy:

• The office of the executive is powerful so that the president can reward cooperating legislators with cabinet posts, pork projects, and policy concessions.
• Congress, too, is strong and can provide oversight of the president.
• Other institutions in the democracy are vigorous, especially a free media but also the courts, public prosecutors, and other independent oversight institutions.

Across much of Latin America, multiparty presidentialism has boosted political stability. As long as robust political competition and a strong set of autonomous institutions exist and potential excesses are kept within bounds, these multiparty democracies have not degenerated into systemic corruption.  

Moving Forward

Challenges to the development of an American multiparty system abound, but it is important to recognize that with only two parties, the American system is an outlier.  I believe, as do Lee Drutman and most political scientists, that we must find our way to a multiparty system if we are to overcome the extreme and poisonous hyperpartisanship that has characterized American politics for the last generation.

Next: Ranked Choice Voting

When Identity Dominates Politics

Third in a series on moving toward a multiparty democracy

I had intended this post to examine how more political parties might break the doom loop of our toxic political partisanship.  But I realize I need first to look at how the question of identity has come to dominate our politics.

As Lee Drutman explains in his Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop, political conflict tends to break down into two dominant questions:

1. Who gets what?  This is a question of economics and the distribution of material resources.  It typically breaks down into a conflict between:

• government as interventionist and egalitarian, actively rebalancing inequities by redistribution through social programs and taxation, and
• a market-oriented perspective, where government protects property rights but mostly gets out of the way with little regulation, low taxes, and few transfers.

Because these are ultimately questions of money and material resources, compromise in the who-gets-what question is often possible.  Drutman gives the example:

If I think the top marginal tax rate should be 45% and start at $1,000,000 and you think it should be 25% and start at $500,000, we can meet in the middle.  Let’s say the top rate is 35%, starting at $750,000, and call it a fair compromise. (p. 132)

2. Who are we?  These are questions of national identity, culture, values, and social group hierarchy.  Today, the identity conflict is between cosmopolitan and traditionalist values.  These are much less amenable to compromise. Drutman writes:

Those who hold cosmopolitan values favor individual self-expression and personal liberation over duty and religious observance.  Cosmopolitans are more open to outsiders, more likely to want to leave the past in the past, and more eager for a transformative future.  They are less rooted in any particular place and more open to new experiences, and they embrace more universalist beliefs.  Under these values, diversity is a strength to be celebrated, and immigrants contribute more than they take away.  Cosmopolitans tend to congregate in big cities and are generally younger.

Those who hold traditionalist values are generally nostalgic about the past and pessimistic about the future.  Traditionalists value duty and responsibility over self-expression.  They tend to stay in one place and are less interested in new experiences.  They are rooted in their community and religion, and tend to live in rural areas.  They value preserving their existing community and values, which makes them skeptical toward outsiders with different values.  They often view immigrants as threats. (p. 133)

These are, of course, stereotypes.  And that’s just the problem.  They accurately describe hardly anyone.  But wedged into the two parties, stereotypes are what we’re left with.  Historically, these differences (think abortion) tend to be bitter with little room for compromise.

In the party realignment that occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s (see my previous posts in this series here and here, as well as this one from several years ago), national identity has come to dominate the political discussion, while questions of who gets what are less prominent.  

[Although the Democratic Party has had a stronger emphasis on economic redistribution (for instance, the infrastructure bills passed during the last two years during the Democratic control of the presidency, House and Senate), the Democrats, too, have a strong “donor class” that has prevented real economic distribution.  The result has been increasing economic inequality over the last forty years facilitated by both Democrats and Republicans.]

What has happened, however, is that the question of identity has come to dominate our politics, overwhelming the question of who gets what.  The “cosmopolitans” and the “traditionalists” see each other as utter strangers, even enemies.  Compromise is rare enough to be noteworthy.

In addition to the toxic partisanship that develops when identity becomes the primary issue, the real diversity of interest among people is lost.  Most people are not well represented by either “cosmopolitans” (Democrats) or “traditionalists” (Republicans).  Where does the traditionalist populist from the rust belt who has been decimated by the growing economic inequality of the last forty years find someone to represent him?  Where does the deeply pro-choice, middle-class entrepreneur committed to low regulation and low taxes find someone to represent her?  Where does the Catholic activist committed to the seamless garment of anti-abortion, anti-capital-punishment, and international pacifism find someone to represent them?  Where do I, David Hilfiker, who favors deep taxation of the wealthy with powerful redistribution to the poor and middle-class find someone to represent me?  The answers are the same: the two-party system gives none of us anyone to represent us.  Our votes don’t count because there is no one to vote for.

Two-party hyperpartisanship punishes us all.  Each of us is left voting for the candidates who offend us the least, rather than voting for those who actually represent what we want.

Next: Multiparty democracy elsewhere

The Importance of Political Parties

Second in a series on moving toward a multiparty democracy

To understand how the United States might move away from the toxic partisanship of the last forty years, it’s important to recognize that political parties are not themselves the problem.  In fact, political parties are essential to the functioning of any but the smallest democracy.

Most Americans mistrust political parties and, perhaps covertly, wish we could do without them.  More people identify as independents than as either Democrats or Republicans.  Many of the Founders were suspicious of parties, and the Constitution does not provide for them.  The Progressive movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century likewise mistrusted parties.  When we consider the toxic partisanship of contemporary American politics, it’s easy to conclude that political parties are themselves the problem.  

Modern political scientists, however, are unanimous in their belief that democracy requires political parties to structure conflict, to allow disparate citizens to work together in common purpose.  In Breaking the Two-Party Doom Loop, Lee Drutman writes,

• Modern mass democracy really is unthinkable without parties because parties are the key institution leading disparate citizens to common purpose.
• Parties help citizens to feel represented, giving them a stake in the larger political system.
• They engage citizens who would otherwise ignore politics.
• They explain to ordinary people why they should care about politics by broadcasting and raising the stakes. …
• Parties set the alternatives and frame the debates.
• They organize political conflict to render it comprehensible.
• They help channel political ambition into responsible service and vet candidates for quality.
• Without competing parties to aggregate and simplify alternatives, voters lack meaningful and quality choices. …
• Dictatorships have no party competition. Democracies do. (p. 41)

So political parties are necessary.  

Political conflict and partisanship are necessary parts of the process, too.  The naïve notion of the Founders and later the Progressive Movement that all issues could evolve toward consensus — and thus no ultimate need for political conflict — misunderstands the nature of politics.  Issues about which there is consensus don’t need the political process.  In real life, however, groups have different interests and the political process is necessary for making decisions when groups cannot agree.  Compromise — not consensus — is the end result of the political process.

As I explored in the last post, however, when there are only two parties and they become ideologically sorted, the devolution into toxic partisanship is virtually inevitable.  The solution is not getting rid of parties but, paradoxically, to change the electoral process to encourage more parties.  The next post will describe how a multiparty system blunts the toxicity of political parties and encourages cooperation and compromise.